There is no doubt that, for Turkey, the most critical moment in 2015 will be the June elections. Following that, the system will be following a straight line without elections for 4 years. This interval is long enough for the political willpower and political parties to handle many crucial problems with the worry of minimum votes and image.
Also, Turkey will be facing two crucial matters:
The Resolution Process and the Constitution matter…
We already know that the results of the 2015 elections will have a direct effect on these two matters.
Let us be realistic. The existing experience, in other words, the relations and balances between the four main political parties, is showing that a new constitution will only be possible if AK Party makes this move on its own or if there is consent between HDP and AK Party.
Will the vote rate of AK Party be enough to reach a constitutional majority in the parliament or at least to reach 330 parliamentarians that will be enough to take the constitution draft to referendum?
This is the main question.
“Will HDP enter the elections or not?” has a vital importance for the answer. In the case HDP enters the elections rather than nominating independent candidates, and stays below the 10 percent threshold, AK Party might even reach 367 parliamentarians.
Also, if HDP passes the 10 percent threshold by stealing votes from CHP and with a synergy that will be evident under existing political condition, it will create a contrary result. Especially by losing parliamentarians in the Southeast region, AK Party’s 330-parliamentarian number might be lost.
Which “choice” is more “realistic”? Also, what would be the “results”?
Exceeding the 10 percent threshold is a really difficult gap for HDP. Such a choice from HDP might amount to de-activating HDP and forcing AK Party to deal with Qandil directly from the point of “radical organizers”. However, as of its results, a single party being left with all the political power in the sense of preparing a constitution will cause a “conflict” as much as “resolution” in general in Turkey and in the Kurdish issue, at least it will keep the possibility of “high tension”.
In spite of that, if HDP passes the 10 percent threshold, this will push Turkey to meet with the “founder Kurdish factor” both in the resolution of the Kurdish issue and in the preparation of a new communal agreement. Such a meeting might come to mean overcoming a democratic gap over the Kurdish issue, or on the contrary, might also mean new tension, an increase in the conflict, a reshaping of the political array….
It should be regarded that all the assumptions we had made until now are pointing at the compact gap in Turkey, rather than the Resolution Process or the preparation of a constitution, and thus are a nominee to re-define the opposing party issue. Then, will these assumptions and possibilities have an effect on the election campaigns? Or, will the election campaigns have an effect on the Resolution Process’ progress in the short term?
There are no doubts…
One of the most important objectives of AK Party seems to be acquiring 4-5 percent of votes from the MHP voter. Davutoğlu’s language, that rejuvenates the tradition, state, history and his style of emphasizing the civilizor comprehension, can be evaluated as a trump card in this sense.
These conditions will be pushing the political rulership to use an attentive and two-way language related with the Resolution Process until the elections. The “political language”, which emphasizes the “Secure language” and resolution willpower, however, brings forth pre-conditions….
It could be said that the similar situation is valid from the point of HDP. It could also be said that in HDP corridors, there is a strong, fighter and prudent language being spoken. At the same rate, the strong and fighter language is directed at the effects of the elections: the prudent language also underlines the importance given to the Resolution Process.
The developments until June are vital…
Because post-June elections are even more vital…..
